Game theoretic decentralized feedback controls in Markov jump processes by Bagagiolo, F. et al.
JOTA manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Game Theoretic Decentralized Feedback Controls in
Markov Jump Processes
Using the LaTex Template
Fabio Bagagiolo · Dario Bauso · Rosario
Maggistro · Marta Zoppello
Received: date / Accepted: date
Fabio Bagagiolo
University of Trento
Trento, Italy
fabio.bagagiolo@unitn.it
Dario Bauso
University of Sheffield
Sheffield, England
d.bauso@sheffield.ac.uk
Rosario Maggistro (corresponding author)
University of Trento
Trento, Italy
rosario.maggistro@unitn.it
Marta Zoppello
University of Trento
Trento, Italy
marta.zoppello@unitn.it
2 Fabio Bagagiolo et al.
Abstract This paper studies a decentralized routing problem over a network,
using the paradigm of mean-field games with large number of players. Building
on a state space extension technique, we turn the problem into an optimal con-
trol one for each single player. The main contribution is an explicit expression
of the optimal decentralized control which guarantees the convergence both
to local and global equilibrium points. Furthermore, we study the stability of
the system also in the presence of a delay which we model using an hysteresis
operator. As a result of the hysteresis, we prove existence of multiple equilib-
rium points and analyze convergence conditions. The stability of the system
is illustrated via numerical studies .
Keywords Optimal control · Mean field games · Inverse control problem ·
Decentralized routing policies · Hysteresis
Mathematics Subject Classification (2000) 91A13 · 91A25 · 49N25 ·
49L20 · 47J40
1 Introduction
In recent years, dynamics on networks have sparked interest in different ap-
plication domains such as data transmission, traffic flows and consensus (see
[1–3]) just to name a few. In this paper, we investigate a routing problem
defined over a network. The problem involves a population of individuals, re-
ferred to as players. As main contribution, we provide convergence conditions
to an equilibrium point, characterized by uniform distribution over all the ver-
tices of the network. At the equilibrium, each player plays its best response,
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given the observed distribution of the other players. To prove such a conver-
gence result, we recast the problem within the framework of optimal control
theory. A similar problem is studied in [4], in which the authors consider a
centralized control and a density flow for each edge dependent on the density
of the whole population. This implies that each player minimizes a common
cost functional which depends on the whole population’s density distribution.
Differently from [4], we consider a decentralized control (as in [5–7]), in which
the density of each node is controlled locally. We highlight next three distinct
approaches relating to routing/jump problems. The first one consists in con-
trolling the probability to jump from a node to another one (or to flow along
the edges) [4]. The second one consists in controlling the transition rate from
nodes (or edges) [8], and the last one in assigning the product among the
probability and the relative transition rate. As in [9], in this paper we use the
last approach, in particular we control the product between the probability
to jump from one node to an adjacent one and the relative transition rate.
In the same spirit as in inverse control problems, [10], we provide an explicit
expression of the running cost function in order to obtain our desired optimal
feedback control as solution of the optimal control problem.
In this paper, we consider the problem of stabilizing the system under the
assumption that each agent ignores both the controls of the far agents and the
network topology. We formulate the problem as follows: from a microscopic
point of view, each player jumps from a node to an adjacent one according to a
continuous-time Markov process. From a macroscopic point of view, each node
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is characterized by a dynamics describing the time-evolution of the density.
Such dynamics depends on a decentralized control. We rearrange the problem
as a mean-field game and then via a state-space extension approach as an
optimal control one. The state space extension procedure is reminiscent of the
McKaen-Vlasov control problem, in which the statistical distribution is en-
coded by our density. Similarities and differences between the McKean-Vlasov
and the Mean-Field framework are analyzed in [11].
Furthermore, we prove convergence to a local equilibrium which is character-
ized by an equal density on the neighbor nodes. Finally, we prove a similar con-
vergence result for the global equilibrium, characterized by a uniform distribu-
tion of the density over all nodes. We then introduce a hysteresis operator act-
ing on the optimal feedback decentralized control. A similar model was already
discussed in [12]. The authors make a rigorous treatment of continuous-time
average consensus dynamics with uniform quantization in communications.
The consensus is reached by quantized measurement which are transmitted
using a delay thermostat. In contrast to this, we use a different hysteresis op-
erator, the play operator, that can be considered as a concatenation of delayed
thermostats. Moreover, we apply such an operator to our control, and this re-
sults in a nonlinear dynamics. We use an hysteresis to capture a scenario where
the players have distorted information on the density distribution in neighbor
nodes. We prove that the problem has multiple equilibrium points, and we
prove their stability.
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1.1 Related Literature
The mean-field game theory was developed in the work of M.Huang, R. Malhame´
and P. Caines [13, 14] and independently in that of J. M. Lasry and P.L. Li-
ons [15,16], where the new standard terminology of Mean Field Games (MFG)
was introduced. This theory includes methods and techniques to study differ-
ential games with a large population of rational players, and it is based on the
assumption that the population influences the individuals’ strategies through
mean-field parameters. In addition to this theory, the notion of Oblivious Equi-
libria for large population dynamical game was introduced by G. Weintraub, C.
Benkard, and B. Van Roy [17] in the framework of Markov Decision Processes.
Several application domains, such as economic, physics, biology and network
engineering accommodate mean-field game theoretical models (see [16,18–20]).
Decision problems with mean-field coupling terms have also been formalized
and studied in [21], and application to power grid management are recently
provided in [22]. The literature provides explicit solutions in the case of linear
quadratic structure. In most cases, a variety of solution schemes have been
recently proposed, based on discretization and or numerical approximations
(see [18,23]). Computing an explicit solution in the nonlinear case is difficult,
and therefore in this paper, in spirit with [24,25], we reformulate the problem
as an inverse optimal control problem.
Regarding hysteresis, the concept of hysteretic operator is due to Krasnoselskii
and his co-worker [26]. There are several physical and natural phenomena in
which hysteresis occurs such as in filtration through porous media, phase tran-
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sition, superconductivity, shape memory and communication delay (see [12,27]
for more details).
1.2 Structure of the Paper
This paper is organized as follows: a mean-field game formulation of the prob-
lem is provided in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, we introduce a state-space extension
solution approach which is an alternative method to the classical fixed point
one and exhibits the optimal decentralized feedback control under a suitable
assumption. In Sect. 4 we study the convergence to and the stability of a local
Wardrop equilibrium and then its extension to a global equilibrium. In Sect. 5
we carry out numerical studies. Finally, in Sect. 6 we introduce the play oper-
ator which acts on the control function, and study both the global equilibrium
and the stability of the density equation subject to this operator.
2 Model and Problem Set-up
In this section, we provide a model of a pedestrian density flow over a network
with dynamics defined on each node, and using a line graph as topology. Let
G be a graph with h nodes, e edges, and vertex degree di for i = 1, . . . , h.
We define the line graph L(G) = (V,E) to be the graph with n = e nodes
and m = 12
∑h
i=1 d
2
i edges. In particular, the graph is obtained by associating
a vertex to each edge of the original graph and connecting two vertices with
an edge if and only if the corresponding edges of G have a vertex in common.
Hence, instead of considering a flux on the edges, from now on we will consider
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jumps between vertices. Now, let a connected line graph L(G) = (V,E) be
given, where V = {1, . . . , n} is the set of vertices and E = {1, . . . ,m} is the
set of edges. For each node i ∈ V , let us denote by N(i) the set of neighbor
nodes of i:
N(i) = {j ∈ V : {i, j} ∈ E} .
We consider a large population of players and each of them is characterized
by a time-varying state X(t) ∈ V at time t ∈ [0, T ], where [0, T ] is the time
horizon window. Players represent pedestrians and jump across the nodes of
the graph according to a decentralized routing policy described by the matrix-
valued function
u(·) :R+ −→ Rn×n+ , t 7−→ u(t). (1)
Note that u takes value in Rn×n+ because each component uij is the product
between the probability to jump from one node to an adjacent one and the
relative transition rate.
Let i ∈ V be the player’s initial state. The state evolution of a single player
is then captured by the following continuous-time Markov process:
{X(t), t ≥ 0}
qij(uij) =

uij , j ∈ N(i), j 6= i,
−∑k∈N(i),k 6=i uik, i = j,
0, otherwise,
(2)
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where qij is the microscopic dynamics from i to j.
Denote by ρ the vector whose components are the densities on vertices. This
implies that the sum of the components is equal to one. Thus we have
ρ ∈ D := {ρˆ ∈ [0, 1]n :
∑
i∈V
ρˆi = 1}.
The density evolution can be described by the following forward Kolmogorov
Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE)
ρ˙(t) = ρ(t)A(u),
ρ(0) = ρ0,
(3)
where ρ is a row vector, ρ0 is the initial condition and the matrix-valued
function A : Rn×n+ → Rn×n is given by
Aij(u) =

uij if j ∈ N(i), j 6= i,
−∑j∈N(i),j 6=i uij if i = j,
0 if j 6∈ N(i).
Equation (3) establishes that the density variation on each node balancing
densities on neighbor nodes.
It is well known that the uniform distribution of the density on a graph corre-
sponds to a Wardrop equilibrium [28]. Since we are considering a line graph,
our aim is to achieve a uniform distribution of the density over all nodes. Indeed
in traffic network the Wardrop equilibrium corresponds to equidistribution of
agents along edges. Therefore on its line graph we view the equilibrium as
uniform distribution on nodes. We start by proving convergence to a local
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equilibrium, i.e. a uniform density on the nodes adjacent to i.
For each player, consider a running cost `(·) : V × [0, 1]n × Rn×n+ → [0,+∞[,
and an exit cost g(·) : V × [0, 1]n → [0,+∞[ of the form given below
`(i, ρ, u) =
∑
j∈N(i),j 6=i
u2ij
2
(γij(ρ))
+
, (4)
g(i, ρ) = dist(ρ, Mˆi). (5)
where γij is a suitable coefficient yet to be designed and (·)+ is the positive
part operator.
In (5) the dist(ρ, Mˆi) denotes the distance of the vector ρ from the manifold
Mˆi, where Mˆi is the local consensus manifold/local Wardrop equilibrium set
for the player i defined as
Mˆi = {ξ ∈ Rn : ξj = ξi ∀ j ∈ N(i)}. (6)
Therefore, the choice of the exit cost g(i, ρ) describes the difference between
the number of agents in the node i and the local equidistribution of agents
among the adjacent nodes.
The problem in its general form is then the following:
Problem 1: Design a decentralized routing policy to minimize the output dis-
agreement, i.e., each player solves the following problem:
infu(·) J(i, u(·), ρ[·](·), ·),
J(·) = ∫ T
t
`(X(τ), ρ(τ), u(τ))dτ + g(X(T ), ρ(T )),
{X(t), t ≥ 0} as in (2),
X(t) = i,
(7)
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where u is the control (1) taking value in Rn×n+ for any t ∈ [0, T ] and ρ evolves
as in (3). Note that every player minimizes a cost functional which depends
on the density of his neighbours. Thus, the microscopic (2) and macroscopic
(3) representations of the system are strongly intertwined which makes the
problem different from classical optimal control.
2.1 Mean-Field Formulation
This subsection presents a mean-field formulation of problem (7). Let v(i, t)
be the value function of the optimization problem (7) starting from time t in
state i. We can establish the following preliminary result.
Lemma 2.1 The mean-field system for the decentralized routing problem in
Problem 1 takes the form:
v˙(i, t) +H(i,∆(v), t) = 0 in V × [0, T [,
v(i, T ) = g(i, ρ(T )),∀x ∈ V,
ρ˙(t) = ρ(t)A(u∗),
ρ(0) = ρ0,
(8)
where
H(i,∆(v), t) = inf
u
{ ∑
j∈N(i)
qij(v(j, t)− v(i, t)) + `(i, ρ, u)
}
, (9)
and g is given as in (5).
In the expression above, ∆(v) denotes the difference of the value function com-
puted in two successive vertices, qij is given in (2) and `(i, ρ, u) as in (4). The
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optimal time-varying control u∗(i, t) is given by
u∗(i, t) ∈ arg min
u
{∑
j∈V
qij(v(j, t)− v(i, t)) + `(i, ρ, u)
}
. (10)
Proof.: To prove the first equation of (8) we know from dynamic programming
that
v˙(i, t) + inf
u
{ ∑
j∈N(i)
qij(v(j, t)− v(i, t)) + `(i, ρ, u)
}
= 0 in V × [0, T [.
We obtain the first equation, by introducing the Hamiltonian in (9). Since
(2) depends on the routing policy u, then the latter is obtained minimizing
the Hamiltonian as expressed by (10). The second equation is the boundary
condition on the terminal cost. The third and fourth equation are the forward
Kolmogorov equation and the corresponding initial condition. uunionsq
The mean-field game (8) appears in the form of two coupled ODEs linked
in a forward-backward way. The first equation in (8) is the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation with variable v(i, t) and parametrized in ρ(·). Given
the boundary condition on final state and assuming a given population density
behaviour captured by ρ(·), the HJB equation is solved backwards and returns
the value function and the optimal control (10). The Kolmogorov equation is
defined on variable ρ(·) and parametrized in u∗(i, t). Given the initial condition
ρ(0) = ρ0 and assuming a given individual behaviour described by u
∗, the
density equation is solved forward and returns the population time evolution
ρ(t).
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3 State Space Extension
We solve Problem 1 and the related mean-field game (8) through state space
extension, in spirit with [4]; namely we review ρ as an additional state variable.
Then the resulting problem is of the form
inf
u(·)
J(i, u(·), ρ[·](·), ·),
subject to {X(t), t ≤ 0} as in (2),
ρ˙(t) = ρ(t)A(u).
We are looking for a value function V˜ (i, ρ, t) which depends on i and on the
density vector ρ as a state variable, rather than as a parameter as in (7). The
problem can be rewritten as follow.
Lemma 3.1 The mean-field system for the decentralized routing problem in
Problem 1 takes the form:
∂tV˜ (i, ρ, t) + H˜(i, ρ,∆(V˜ ), ∂ρV˜ , t) = 0 in V × [0, 1]n × [0, T [,
V˜ (i, ρ, T ) = g(i, ρ(T )),
(11)
where for the Hamiltonian we have
H˜(i, ρ,∆(V˜ ), ∂ρV˜ , t) = inf
u
{ ∑
j∈N(i)
qij(V˜ (j, ρ, t)−V˜ (i, ρ, t))+∂ρV˜ (i, ρ, t)(ρA(u))T+`(i, ρ, u)
}
,
(12)
and the optimal time-varying control u∗(i, ρ, t) is given by
u∗(i, ρ, t) ∈ arg min
u
{ ∑
j∈N(i)
qij(V˜ (j, ρ, t)−V˜ (i, ρ, t))+∂ρV˜ (i, ρ, t)(ρA(u))T+`(i, ρ, u)
}
.
(13)
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Proof: From dynamic programming we obtain
∂tV˜ (i, ρ, t)+inf
u
{∑
j∈V
qij(V˜ (j, ρ, t)−V˜ (i, ρ, t))+∂ρV˜ (i, ρ, t)(ρA(u))T+`(i, ρ, u)
}
= 0.
By introducing the Hamiltonian H˜(i, ρ,∆(V˜ ), ∂ρV˜ , t) given in (12), the first
equation is proven. To prove (13), observe that the optimal control is the
minimizer in the computation of the extended Hamiltonian. Finally, the second
equation in (11) is the boundary condition. uunionsq
Remark 3.1 The use of the state space extension approach reduces our initial
problem to an optimal control problem. Therefore from now on we will no
longer consider the mean field formulation.
Now, our aim is to review the optimal control problem as an inverse problem.
Our aim is to find a suitable γij (see (4)) such that the optimal control u
∗
ij ,
which is the argmin of the extended Hamiltonian, is
u∗ij =

ρi(t)− ρj(t) ρi(t) > ρj(t), j ∈ N(i),
0 otherwise.
(14)
In [4] for the infinite horizon problem, the authors take the value functions
as V (ρ) = dist(ρ,M), where M is the global equilibrium manifold. Therefore
in our finite horizon problem we assume that
V (i, ρ) = dist(ρ,Mi) =
√√√√√ ∑
j∈N(i)
(
ρj −
∑
k∈N(i)
ρk
#N(i)
)2
. (15)
Note that the above satisfies the boundary condition in (11), according to our
choice of the exit cost g (see (5)).
We can write (3) for the generic component i as
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ρ˙i(t) =
∑
j∈N(i),j 6=i
ρj(t)uji −
∑
j∈N(i),j 6=i
ρi(t)uij .
Starting from the Hamiltonian (12) (see also (4)) we assume that if ρi 6= ρj ,
γij is
γij(ρ) =
(
ρ2i − ρiρj − dist(ρ, Mˆj)dist(ρ, Mˆi) + dist(ρ, Mˆi)2
(ρi − ρj)dist(ρ, Mˆi)
)
. (16)
We want to prove that, using (16), the correspondent running cost (4) is such
that our control (14) is the optimal one. We have the following cases:
a) γij > 0
The Hamiltonian (12) is strictly convex in uij . Therefore the optimal con-
trol uij is the solution of
∂H˜
∂uij
= uijγij(ρ) +
ρiρj − ρ2i
dist(ρ, Mˆi)
+ dist(ρ, Mˆj)− dist(ρ, Mˆi) = 0. (17)
Namely if ρi > ρj , uij = ρi − ρj , instead if ρi < ρj since we are supposing
that uij ∈ R+ we have that the optimal control is uij = 0.
b) γij ≤ 0
The Hamiltonian (12) is linear in uij and is increasing or decreasing de-
pending on the sign of
βij =
ρiρj − ρ2i
dist(ρ, Mˆi)
+ dist(ρ, Mˆj)− dist(ρ, Mˆi) = −γij(ρ)(ρi − ρj)
– if ρi > ρj the Hamiltonian is increasing in uij , hence it admits minimum
at uij = 0 ,
– if ρi < ρj the Hamiltonian is decreasing in uij , therefore it takes smaller
and smaller values as uij → +∞.
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Now note that, if the densities are converging in time to the same value,
which is the case if we use the control u∗ij , the function (16) is never neg-
ative and thus case b) before cannot occur. Simulations will show this
phenomenon and also suggest that
lim
ρi→ρj ,j∈N(i)\{i}
γij = +∞. (18)
which is coherent with the constraint u∗ij = 0. Therefore, using function (16),
the corresponding running cost given by
`(i, ρ, u) =
∑
j∈N(i), j 6=i ρi>ρj
u2ij
2
(
ρ2i − ρiρj − dist(ρ, Mˆj)dist(ρ, Mˆi) + dist(ρ, Mˆi)2
(ρi − ρj)dist(ρ, Mˆi)
)+
︸ ︷︷ ︸
γij(ρ)
,
(19)
leads the optimal feedback control to take the same value as in (14). Moreover,
when using control (14), the Hamiltonian (12) also converges to zero as t tends
to infinity. Hence, the function V (i, ρ) as defined in (15), is almost a solution
of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman problem (11). Such a consideration leads to
the fact that, at least when time becomes large, the control (14) is optimal.
The fact that the Hamiltonian (12) converges to zero derives from (17) where
the second addendum of the right-hand side is bounded (the distance from
the manifold is larger than |ρi − ρj | up to a multiplicative constant). This
boundedness leads to (ρi − ρj)2γij(ρ)→ 0 and hence the conclusion, because
inside the Hamiltonian we almost have (17) multiplied by (ρi − ρj).
Now with the control (14), we can rewrite the evolution of ρ as
ρ˙i(t) =
∑
j 6=i,j∈N(i):ρj>ρi
ρj(t)(ρj(t)− ρi(t))−
∑
j∈N(i):ρi>ρj
ρi(t)(ρi(t)− ρj(t)) ∀i
(20)
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Now our aim is to study the stability properties of dynamical system (20).
In other words if using the optimal control u∗ij the system converges to an
equilibrium.
4 Wardrop Equilibrium
In this section, we will show how to obtain a uniform distribution of the density
ρ, at first on a neighborhood of a node and then throughout the graph.
The right-hand side of equation (20) is zero only when ρi = ρj ∀i ∈ V and
j ∈ N(i), which leads to a uniform density over the nodes.
The following assumption establishes that for a given feasible target manifold,
there always exists a decentralized routing policy u(t) which drives the density
ρ toward the relative manifold Mˆi (see (6)).
This assumption will be used later on to prove the convergence to a local
Wardop equilibrium.
Fig. 1 Geometric illustration of the Attainability condition.
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Assumption 1 (Attainability condition)
Let Mˆi be given by (6), r > 0 and Si = {ρ : dist(ρ, Mˆi) < r}. For all ρ ∈ Si\Mˆi
there exists an element in the projection, ξ(i, ρ) ∈ ΠMˆiρ, such that the value
val[λi] is negative for every λi = (ρ(t)− ξ(i, ρ)), namely
∀i, val[λi] = inf
u
{λi ·[(I−∂ρ(ξ(i, ρ)))ρ˙T +
∑
j∈N(i)
(ξ(j, ρ)−ξ(i, ρ))qij ]} < 0, (21)
where ∂ρξ(i, ρ) is a constant matrix since ξ(i, ρ) is a linear function of ρ.
We point out that, as we will show in Section 5 (see (25)), assumption (21) is
satisfied by our optimal control u∗ij (14).
Assumption (21) represents the trend of the agents in node i to be influenced
by the choices of the neighbor agents. Agents can act in order to reach the
same density as in the adjacent nodes.
In the proof of the next theorem, we review the value function of (11) as a
Lyapunov function.
Theorem 4.1 Let Assumption 1 hold true. Then, ρ(t) converges asymptoti-
cally to Mˆi, i.e.
lim
t→∞ dist(ρ, Mˆi) = 0. (22)
Proof : Let ρ be a solution of (3) with initial value ρ(0) ∈ Si \ Mˆi.
Set τ = {inf t > 0 : ρ(t) ∈ Mˆi} ≤ ∞ and let V (i(t), ρ(t)) = dist(ρ(t), Mˆi). For
all t ∈ [0, τ ] and ξ ∈ ΠMˆi(ρ(t)). We wish to compute V˙ (i(t), ρ(t)) as the limit
of the incremental ratio, thus at first we write its numerator, where X(t) is
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the Markov process giving the evolution of the index i(t), that is:
V (i(t), ρ(t+ dt))− V (i(t), ρ(t)) + V (i(t+ dt), ρ(t))− V (i(t), ρ(t)) =
‖ρ(t+ dt)− ξ(ρ(t+ dt), X(t))‖ − ‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖+
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t+ dt))‖ − ‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖ =
‖ρ(t) + ρ˙(t)dt− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))−∇ρξ(ρ(t), X(t))ρ˙(t)dt‖−
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖+ |dt|ε(dt)+
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))− ∂Xξ(ρ(t), X(t))X˙(t)dt+ o(dt)‖ − ‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖
where limdt→0 ε(dt) = 0 and limdt→0 o(dt) = 0. Hence
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V˙ (i(t), ρ(t)) =
lim
dt→0
1
dt
(‖ρ(t) + ρ˙(t)dt− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))−∇ρξ(ρ(t), X(t))ρ˙(t)dt‖2
‖ρ(t) + ρ˙(t)dt− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))−∇ρξ(ρ(t), X(t))ρ˙(t)dt‖ −
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖2
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖ + |dt|ε(dt)+
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))− ∂Xξ(ρ(t), X(t))X˙(t)dt‖2
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))− ∂Xξ(ρ(t), X(t))X˙(t)dt‖
−
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖2
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖ + o(dt)
)
=
lim
dt→0
1
dt
(‖ρ(t) + ρ˙(t)dt− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))−∇ρξ(ρ(t), X(t))ρ˙(t)dt‖2
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖+O(√dt) −
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖2
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖ + |dt|ε(dt)+
‖ρ(t)− ξ(X(t))− ∂Xξ(ρ(t), X(t))X˙(t)dt‖2
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖+O(√dt) −
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖2
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖ + o(dt)
)
=
1
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖
d
dt
(
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t), X(t))‖2
)
≤
2
‖ρ(t)− ξ(i, ρ)‖
[
(ρ(t)− ξ(i, ρ))·(
(I −∇ρ(ξ(i, ρ)))ρ˙(t)T +
∑
j∈N(i)
(ξ(j, ρ)− ξ(i, ρ))qij
)]
.
Using now Assumption 1 we have that the second factor of the last product is
strictly negative, hence V˙ (i(t), ρ(t)) < 0. This proves not only that a Wardrop
equilibrium but also that the solution ρ of the dynamics (3) is locally asymp-
totically stable for the Lyapunov theorem. uunionsq
The next step is to prove the asymptotic convergence of ρ, solution of (3), to
the global consensus manifold M defined as follows
M = {ρ ∈ D : ρ = 1 1
n
}, (23)
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where n is the number of nodes.
Corollary 4.1 Let Assumption 1 hold true, then
lim
t→+∞ d(ρ(t),M) = 0.
Proof: We are in the hypothesis of Theorem (4.1), then
lim
t→∞ dist(ρ, Mˆi) = 0.
It follows that for any sequence (tm)m∈N such that tm → +∞ we have that
ρi → β
ρj → β ∀ j ∈ N(i)
ρk → β ∀ k ∈ N(j) s.t j ∈ N(i)
...
(24)
By doing this, since the graph is connected, we can conclude that
ρi(tm)→ β = 1
n
∀i ∈ V.
Then, there exists a subsequence (tm`)`∈N such that
ρi(tm`)→
1
n
∀i ∈ V.
This proves that ρ(t)→ 1n for t→ +∞ and thus limt→+∞ d(ρ(t),M) = 0. uunionsq
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5 Numerical Example
In this section, numerical simulation show that on a graph with seven nodes,
the provided distributed routing policy (14) provides convergence to the equi-
librium.
Consider the following network consisting of 7 nodes and 8 edges.
Fig. 2 Network system with seven nodes.
Solving the Kolmogorov equation (20) with the following initial conditions
ρ1(0) = 0.15, ρ2(0) = 0.2, ρ3(0) = 0.1, ρ4(0) = 0.3,
ρ5(0) = 0.1, ρ6(0) = 0.15, ρ7(0) = 0,
we obtain the density evolution as shown in Fig. 3
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Fig. 3 Simulation of the density.
As expected the density converges to the global equilibrium in which all
the ρi are equal.
In Fig. 4 we can see that the function γij (16) is positive, in accordance with
our statements in Section 3.
Fig. 4 Evolution of γ12 and γ16 along the trajectories obtained using control u∗ij (14).
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Note that the optimal control u∗ij = (ρi − ρj)+ satisfies Assumption 1 as
by defining
αi = λi · [(I − ∂ρ(ξ(i, ρ)))ρ˙(t)T +
∑
j∈N(i)
(ξ(j, ρ)− ξ(i, ρ))qij ], ∀i = 1, · · · , 7,
we have that the maximum values of αi are
max
ρ
{α1} = −6.1489 · 10−7 max
ρ
{α2} = −2.1462 · 10−6
max
ρ
{α3} = −3.1123 · 10−9 max
ρ
{α4} = −6.7065 · 10−7
max
ρ
{α5} = −8.0771 · 10−7 max
ρ
{α6} = −2.1169 · 10−6
max
ρ
{α7} = −7.4670 · 10−7.
(25)
Then, function αi is negative for all i, for our choice of the control.
According to Theorem (4.1), in Fig. 4 we show that the distance of ρi from
the relative Mˆi, ∀i = 1, . . . , 7, converges to zero.
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Fig. 5 Distances to the consensus manifolds.
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6 Stability with Hysteresis
In the following section we study stability of the macroscopic dynamics of the
vector ρ when the optimal decentralized feedback control (14) is affected by
a hysteresis phenomena modeled by a scalar play operator. We study how
the evolution of the macroscopic equation changes when we apply the play
operator to the control u∗ obtained from (14). Furthermore, we characterize
the set of equilibrium points as union of several manifolds. Finally, we provide
convergence condition for the resulting dynamics.
After introducing the play operator the controlled dynamical system is given
by

ρ˙(t) = ρ(t)A(w),
w(t) = P [u∗]+(t),
ρ(0) = ρ0,
w(0) = w0,
(26)
where P [·](·) is the play operator whose behavior is explained in the following
subsection and ∧+ is the positive part.
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6.1 The Play operator
Fig. 6 Hysteresis play operator
Let ε > 0 be a parameter which characterizes the Play operator and define
Ωε :=
{
(u, v) ∈ R2 : u− ε < v < u+ ε} .
The behavior of the scalar play operator v(·) := P [u](·), with its typical hys-
teresis loops, can be described using Fig. 6. For instance, supposing that u is
piecewise monotone, if (u(t), v(t)) ∈ Ωε then v is constant in a neighborhood
of t; if v(t) = u(t)− ε and u is non increasing in [t, t+ τ ] (with small τ) then v
stays constant in [t, t+τ ] ; if v(t) = u(t)−ε and u is non decreasing in [t, t+τ ]
then v = u(t)−ε in [t, t+τ ]. A similar argument holds when replacing u(t)−ε
by u(t) + ε.
The same explanation of the play operator behavior can be extended to con-
tinuous inputs [26,27].
With reference to system (26), we consider as input to matrix A the posi-
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tive part of the play operator, applied to the control u∗ij = (ρi − ρj)+, i.e.
wij(t) = P [(ρi − ρj)]+(t).
Remark 6.1 Since (ρi(0)− ρj(0)) = −(ρj(0)− ρi(0)), then
(ρi(t)− ρj(t)) = −(ρj(t)− ρi(t)) ∀t.
Thus it is not a restriction as
P [(ρi−ρj)](0) = −P [(ρj−ρi)](0), hence P [(ρi−ρj)](t) = −P [(ρj−ρi)](t) ∀t.
Moreover since we are taking the positive part of the play, we will have that if
wij > 0 then wji = 0.
6.2 Equilibria
We are looking for the equilibrium points of the first equation of (26) consid-
ering the simple case of a network with four nodes as the one depicted in Fig. 7
Fig. 7 Network system with four nodes.
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The evolution of the vector ρ is given by
ρ˙1(t) = −
(
w12 + w13
)
ρ1(t) + w21ρ2(t) + w31ρ3(t),
ρ˙2(t) = w12ρ1(t)−
(
w21 + w24
)
ρ2(t) + w42ρ4(t),
ρ˙3(t) = w13ρ1(t)−
(
w31 + w34
)
ρ3(t) + w43ρ4(t),
ρ˙4(t) = w24ρ2(t) + w34ρ3(t)−
(
w42 + w43
)
ρ4(t).
(27)
Case 1
Assume that w12 > 0, w31 > 0, w24 > 0, w43 > 0. If
|ε| > max{ρ4(w43
w12
− w43
w24
)
, ρ4
(w43
w24
− 1), ρ4(w43
w31
− w43
w12
)
, ρ4
(
1− w43
w31
)}
,
then the system to solve is
ρ˙1(t) = −w12ρ1(t) + w31ρ3(t),
ρ˙2(t) = w12ρ1(t)− w24ρ2(t),
ρ˙3(t) = −w31ρ3(t) + w43ρ4(t),
ρ˙4(t) = w24ρ2(t)− w43ρ4(t),
(28)
that is zero in
(
ρ4
w43
w12
, ρ4
w43
w24
, ρ4
w43
w31
, ρ4, w12, w24, w31, w43
)
. (29)
In the following we consider only the values of w12, w24, w31, w43 because their
symmetric w21, w42, w13, w34 are always zero according to Remark 6.1.
Case 2
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Assume that w12 > 0, w31 > 0, w24 > 0, w43 = 0. If |ε| > 1, then the system is
zero in (
0, 0, 0, 1, w12, w31w24, 0
)
. (30)
Case 3
For w12 > 0, w31 > 0, w24 = 0, w43 = 0. If |ε| > max{ρ4, 1 − ρ4}, then the
system is zero in (
0, 1− ρ4, 0, ρ4, w12, w31, 0, 0
)
. (31)
Case 4
For w12 > 0, w31 = 0, w24 = 0, w43 = 0. if |ε| > max{ρ4, ρ3, 1− ρ4 − ρ3} then
the system is zero in
(
0, 1− ρ4 − ρ3, ρ3, ρ4, w12
)
. (32)
Case 5
Assume that all wij = 0 ∀j ∈ N(i). If
|ε| > max{ρ1 − ρ2, ρ2 − ρ4, ρ3 − ρ1, ρ4 − ρ3},
then the equilibrium point of the system is
(1− ρ2 − ρ3 − ρ4, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4,w) = (ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4,0), (33)
where w denotes the vector of all eight wij .
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Remark 6.2 Note that the equilibria in cases 2, 3, 4, 5 can be obtained as
limits of the equilibrium in case 1. Indeed if we let w43 → 0 we end up with
equilibrium (30) and since
∑4
i=1 ρi = 1, ρ4 = 1. If w43 → 0 and w24 → 0 we
obtain equilibrium (31) where we denoted by 1 − ρ4 the indeterminate form
ρ4
w43
w24
, taking into account the conservation of mass. Furthermore if w31 → 0,
w24 → 0 and w43 → 0 we get equilibrium (32), where we call the indeterminate
forms ρ4
w43
w31
and ρ4
w43
w24
respectively ρ3 and 1− ρ4 − ρ3 for the same reason as
before.
Finally letting all wij → 0 we end up with equilibrium (33), in which ρ2,
ρ3, and 1 − ρ2 − ρ3 − ρ4 denote the indeterminate forms ρ4w43w24 , ρ4w43w31 , and
ρ4
w43
w12
that respect the conservation of mass.
Moreover, our choice of taking w12 > 0, w31 > 0, w24 > 0, w43 > 0 and not
other wij is completely arbitrary, indeed taking any 4 non symmetric wij > 0
we will end up with an equilibrium of the same type of (29).
In the following numerical simulations we show the behavior of the system for
two different choices of the parameter ε
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 8 Numerical simulations of the system converging to the equilibria in case 1 (Fig. 8(a))
and case 3 (Fig. 8(b))
In Fig. 8(a) we take ε = 0.5. We can see that the densities converge to the
equilibrium (29). Instead in the Fig. 8(b), using ε = 0.95, the system converges
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to equilibrium (31).
6.3 Stability
In the following subsection we show that also in the presence of the play op-
erator we converge to the equilibrium for t → ∞. Before doing this we make
a further assumption for the manifold as defined next.
The global equilibrium manifold M in this case is the union of different equi-
librium manifolds
M =
5⋃
z=1
Mz, (34)
where M¯z denotes the manifold whose points are equilibria relative to the z-th
case.
Assumption 2
Let M be given as in (34), s > 0 and S = {ρ : dist(ρ,M) < s}. For all
ρ = (ρ, w) ∈ S \M , there exists ξ ∈ ΠMρ such that the value val[λ] is negative
for every λ = (ρ− ξ), namely
val[λ] = inf
u
{λ · (I − ∂ρξ(ρ(t)))ρ˙(t)T } < 0. (35)
This assumption is analogous to the attainability (21) in the presence of hys-
teresis. Note that here the term involving qij in (21) is not present, since
depending on whether we are in the node i or in the node j the projection on
the global manifold ξ is the same. Moreover, at the end of this section we will
stress the fact that (35) is satisfied under control wij = P [(ρi − ρj)]+.
Game Theoretic Decentralized Feedback Controls in Markov Jump Processes 33
Theorem 6.1 Let Assumption 2 hold true. Then ρ(t) converges asymptomat-
ically to M , namely
lim
t→+∞ dist(ρ,M) = 0. (36)
Proof.: Let ρ a solution of (26) with initial value ρ(0) ∈ S \M . Set
τ = {inf t > 0 : ρ(t) ∈M} ≤ ∞ and let V (ρ(t)) = dist(ρ,M). We compute:
V˙ (ρ(t)) =
d
dt
(
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t))‖
)
=
1
‖ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t))‖
[(
ρ(t)− ξ(ρ(t)))(I − ∂ρξ(ρ(t)))ρ˙(t)T] < 0
by (35). Then the solution ρ of (26) is asymptotically stable and we have a
global equilibrium. uunionsq
In the following we deal with some examples of convergence to the equilibria
in different Mz using the decentralized control u
∗
ij = (ρi − ρj)+.
At first we suppose that ε > 1 thus for all t, w(t) satisfies the conditions in
case 2. The system to study is
ρ˙1(t) = −w12(t)ρ1(t) + w31(t)ρ3(t),
ρ˙2(t) = w12(t)ρ1(t) + w24(t)ρ2(t),
ρ˙3(t) = −w31(t)ρ3(t),
ρ˙4(t) = w24(t)ρ2(t).
(37)
From the assumption on the wij we have
∃c > 0 : wij(t) > c ∀t ≥ 0.
Then considering the third equation of (37) we have that
ρ3(t) ≤ e−ctρ3(0)→ 0 for t→ +∞. By contradiction, we suppose that
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ρ1(t)→ ρ¯1 with ρ¯1 > 0. Thus,
lim
t→+∞ ρ˙1(t) = limt→+∞−w12(t)ρ¯1 + limt→+∞w31(t)ρ3(t) 6= 0. (38)
This is a contradiction as the left hand side should be equal to zero. Hence
limt→+∞ ρ1(t) = 0. With similar argument also limt→+∞ ρ2(t) = 0. For the
mass conservation ρ4(t) → 1 for t → +∞ hence we obtain the equilibrium
point (30).
Assuming now that ε > max{ρ4(0), 1−ρ4(0)} and w(0) satisfies the conditions
in case 3, the system becomes
ρ˙1(t) = −w12(t)ρ1(t) + w31(t)ρ3(t),
ρ˙2(t) = w12(t)ρ1(t),
ρ˙3(t) = −w31(t)ρ3(t),
ρ˙4(t) = 0,
(39)
for all t ∈ [0, t¯[ where
t¯ = sup{t ≥ 0 : u∗12 + ε > w12(t) ≡ w12(0) > 0, u∗31 + ε >w31(t) ≡ w31(0) > 0,
w24 ≡ 0, w43 ≡ 0}.
We will now prove that t¯ = +∞.
Let us suppose by contradiction that t¯ < +∞. Obviously ρ4(t) ≡ ρ4(0) in [0, t¯[.
Using the hypothesis over wij we have that ρ3(t) = e
−w31(0)tρ3(0) in [0, t¯[ and
thus ρ3 decreases. Moreover ρ2 is increasing.
Let us now focus on the differences among the densities. Since ρ4 is constant
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and ρ3 ↘ then ρ4−ρ3 ↗. This difference is always less than or equal to ρ4 and
thus it is less than ε. By the continuity of ρ, lim
t→t¯
(ρ4(t)− ρ3(t)) < ε. Therefore
w43 does not change and remains equal to 0 in [0, t¯].
Let us now consider ρ2− ρ4. By (39), in [0, t¯[ ρ2 ↗, thus ρ2− ρ4 increases and
is less than 1− ρ4 < ε. By the previous continuity argument w24 ≡ 0 in [0, t¯].
From the last two results we can conclude that ρ4(t) ≡ ρ4(0) in [0, t¯].
Considering ρ3 − ρ1 we have that, if ρ3 − ρ1 ↘ in [0, t¯[, the last difference is
greater than −ρ1 = ρ4−1+ρ3+ρ2 > ρ4−1 > −ε. This implies ε > ρ1 and thus
using the continuity argument w31(t) = w31(0) > 0 in [0, t¯]. Instead if ρ3−ρ1 ↗
it is always less that ρ3 < 1 − ρ4 < ε. Then as before w31(t) = w31(0) > 0 in
[0, t¯]. From the last one and w43 ≡ 0 we conclude ρ3(t) = ρ3(0)e−w31(0)t in [0, t¯].
Again if ρ1 − ρ2 ↘ it is greater than −ρ2 > ρ4 − 1 > −ε. Proceeding as
before we conclude that w12(t) = w12(0) > 0 in [0, t¯]. Instead if ρ1 − ρ2 ↗
reasoning as before we reach the same conclusion, i.e, w12(t) = w12(0) > 0 in
[0, t¯].
Hence we have proven that in t¯, the same conditions valid in the interval [0, t¯[,
hold. Therefore there exists δ > 0 such that in [0, t¯+ δ], wij(t) are the same as
in t = 0. This is a contradiction as t¯ is a supremum, thus we conclude t¯ = +∞.
We will now prove that the system converges to equilibrium (31). From the
assumption on the wij we have ρ3(t) = e
−w31(0)tρ3(0) → 0 for t → +∞. By
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contradiction, we suppose that ρ1(t)→ ρ¯1 with ρ¯1 > 0. Thus,
lim
t→+∞ ρ˙1(t) = limt→+∞−w12(t)ρ¯1 6= 0. (40)
This is a contradiction as it should be equal to zero. Hence limt→+∞ ρ1(t) = 0.
Regarding ρ4 and ρ2, the first is constant and limt→+∞ ρ2(t) = ρ¯2 > 0. From
the mass conservation ρ¯2 = 1− ρ¯4 hence we obtain an equilibrium point as in
(31).
Using similar arguments, if ε is like in case 4 and 5 we will converge to equi-
libria (32) and (33) respectively.
The above procedure can be extended to the case where ε is such that for all
t we have four non symmetric wij > 0 like in case 1.
Note also that the decentralized control u∗ij = (ρi − ρj)+ satisfies Assump-
tion 2, indeed the function V (ρ(t)) is strictly decreasing along the trajectories
(see Fig. 9).
As a consequence, the distance of ρ from the manifold M is a Lyapunov func-
tion and thus Theorem 6.1 holds true.
The picture below (Fig. 9) displays the distance of ρ from the manifold M1
as function of time. It is visually clear that the time plot is decreasing in
accordance to our expectations.
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Fig. 9 The distance of ρ from the manifold M1.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we study a decentralized routing problem defined over a network.
We show that by reformulating the problem as a mean-field game, we obtain a
consensus dynamics on the densities. Using a state space extension approach
we recast the problem in the framework of optimal control. We give an explicit
expression of a suitable current cost function in order to obtain a preassigned
optimal decentralized control. We provide conditions for the convergence to
both to local and global consensus. In the presence of a play operator, we prove
that the same control does not guarantee convergence to a consensus point.
In this case, we characterize the set of equilibrium points for the hysteretic
system and prove its asymptotic stability.
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